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ABSTRAK 
Sebagai negara muslim terbesar di dunia, sejumlah gerakan Islam di Indonesia meyakini bahwa Piagam 
Jakarta merupakan jalan terbaik untuk mewujudukan syariat Islam karena nilai sejarah yang mulia dalam piagam 
tersebut. Namun, misi tersebut belum tercapai karena mayoritas kelompok dan kekuatan politik Muslim beranggapan 
bahwa Piagam Jakarta sudah tidak relevan lagi dengan kondisi saat ini. Tulisan ini mencoba menganalisis 
pemikiran politik para elite Muhammadiyah, organisasi Islam moderat yang paling berpengaruh di Indonesia, 
terhadap gagasan pembentukan syariat Islam dengan menerapkan Piagam Jakarta sebagai prinsip negara selama 
masa transisi terutama seputar Sidang Tahunan MPR RI 1999–2002. Para elite Muhammadiyah memiliki peranan 
penting dalam menentukan dinamika politik di masa kini dan mendatang. Oleh karena itu, menguraikan pemikiran-
pemikiran merupakan hal yang menarik. Hasil tulisan ini menunjukkan bahwa terdapat tiga model pemikiran 
politik di Muhammadiyah, yaitu moderat-transformatif, moderat-realistis, dan akomodatif-pragmatis. Masing-
masing pemikiran memiliki karakteristik yang berbeda-beda, namun satu hal yang pasti adalah bahwa tidak ada 
elite Muhammadiyah yang mendukung gagasan negara Islam.
Kata Kunci: Piagam Jakarta, syariat Islam, elite Muhammadiyah, pemikiran politik
ABSTRACT 
As the world’s largest predominantly Muslim country, certain Muslim communities in Indonesia believe that 
the Jakarta Charter is an effective bridge to realize Islamic sharia due to its virtuous historical values. Nevertheless, 
the aim is not reached yet, as major Muslim groups and main political forces in the parliament assume that the 
Charter is no longer relevant with current circumstances. This paper is an attempt to examine political thoughts of 
the elites in Muhammadiyah, the most influential Muslim-moderate organization in Indonesia, towards the notion 
of the establishment of Islamic sharia by applying the Jakarta Charter as the state principle during transition era, 
particularly surrounding the annual sessions of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1999–2002. Indeed, 
elites in Muhammadiyah have a significant role to maintain the present and future political trajectory. Thus, it 
is a fascinating study to depict contemporary thoughts of the Muslim elites. As a result, the paper found three 
models of political thoughts in Muhammadiyah namely the moderate-transformative, the moderate-realistic, and 
the accommodative-pragmatic. Each thought has its features and reasons, but one thing for sure is that there is 
none of the elite in Muhammadiyah encourages the concept of the Islamic state.
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INTRODUCTION
After the fall of President Soeharto in May 
1998, Indonesian political situation experienced 
rapid changes. The weakness of political Islam 
under New Order regime eventually reached its 
resurgence during reformation era by the desire 
to adopt Islamic sharia as an Indonesian principle. 
A number of Muslim communities want to put 
the content of the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 
Constitution.2 It can be seen that Indonesia as 
2 The Charter is the source for the notion of Islamic state 
which consists of seven or eight words: “…dengan 
kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-
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the world’s largest Muslim country is the driving 
factor for Muslim people to apply the Charter as 
quickly as possible to gain a noble Islamic goal.
Therefore, when political Islam obtained its 
resurgence particularly under the president of 
Abdurrahman Wahid (famously known as Gus 
Dur) between 1999 and 2001, the amendment 
to the 1945 Constitution Article 29 on religion 
was a heated debate upcoming the annual ses-
sions of the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) in 1999. Some Muslim communities and 
Islam-based political parties took this chance to 
change the Article by lobbying the others during 
the sessions (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2002, p. 34). 
Regarding the article 29 before the amendment, it 
consists of two fold point. Firstly, the state shall 
be based upon belief in the One and Only God. 
Secondly, the state guarantees the freedom for 
each citizen to adhere their credence and worship 
(UUD, 1991; Kompas, 2/09/2002, 30).3
Various regional demonstrations demanded 
the parliament to implement the Jakarta Charter 
in the Constitution. In South Sulawesi, through 
“Declaration of Makassar”, local people desired 
to adopt Islamic sharia (Kompas, 2/11/2001, p. 7; 
26/04/2001, p. 6). Likewise, it also took place in 
Banten, Cianjur, Aceh, and Padang. Even in the 
capital of the state, mayor of West Jakarta issued 
the rule on the obligation for Muslim pupils to 
wear an Islamic dress on Friday and follow the 
speech and praying Jumatan (Sumarjan et al., 
2002, p. 1).
Other reinforcements to the Charter also 
came from militant Muslim organizations such 
as Hizbut Tahrir (The Freedom Party), Majelis 
Mujahidin (The Council of Jihad Fighters), Front 
Pembela Islam (The Islamic Defender Front, FPI), 
Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (The Council of 
Indonesian Islamic Propagation, DDII) and Ke-
satuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (The 
Indonesian Student Action Movement, KAMMI). 
They continuously carried out the protest rally 
in some regions (Ambardi, 2008, p. 217–218). 
pemeluknya” (With the obligation for the followers of 
the Islamic faith to abide by the Islamic sharia).
3 The original text in Indonesian version is 1) Negara 
berdasar atas Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa; 2) Negara 
menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk 
memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat 
menurut agamanya dan kepercayaan itu. 
Conversely, Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul 
Ulama (NU),4 two largest predominantly Muslim 
organizations in Indonesia, rejected the Charter 
due to the consideration of the plurality among 
society.
To portray this point, the paper explores vari-
ous political thoughts amongst elites in Muham-
madiyah during transition era in post-New Order 
regime Indonesia. More interestingly, although 
Muhammadiyah issued an official decision to 
reject the introduction of Islamic sharia, its elites 
have different thoughts which will be scrutinized 
further. 
THE RISE OF ISLAMIC SHARIA  
IN THE TRANSITION ERA:  
A POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY  
APPROACH 
Historically speaking, the debate on the Jakarta 
Charter took place three times in the official ses-
sion. First is in the sessions of Badan Penyelidik 
Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (The 
Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian 
Independence, BPUPKI) upcoming Indonesian 
Independence Day, held on May 29th–June 1st, 
1945. Second is in the sessions of Panitia Per-
siapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (The Preparatory 
Committee for Indonesian Independence, PPKI), 
a day after the Independence, held on August 18th, 
1945. Third is in the sessions of Majelis Konstitu-
ante (The Constitutional Assembly) 1955–1959. 
During these three sorts of the sessions, the 
Muslims-nationalist group wanted to make the 
Jakarta Charter an Indonesian principle. Mean-
while, the secular-nationalists group maintained 
that Indonesia is a multi-religious nation, and 
therefore, it should be a secular state which is 
characterised by the separation between politics 
and religion (Anshari, 1976, p. 23–78).
An analytical classification regarding the 
concept of polity in Indonesia was conducted 
by Assyaukanie (2009, p. 12–19, 57–176). His 
study’s finding demonstrates that there are three 
4 Muhammadiyah is the largest modernist Muslim 
organization in Indonesia established in Yogyakarta, 
November 18th, 1912. Meanwhile, Nahdhatul Ulama 
(The Renaissance of Islamic Scholars, NU) is the 
largest traditionalist Muslim organization in Indonesia 
established in Surabaya (East Java), January 31st, 1926. 
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models of polity imagined and endorsed by 
Indonesian Muslims. First is the Islamic Demo-
cratic State (IDS). This model makes Islam as 
the basis of the state and advocates Muslims to 
have their fundamental roles in Indonesian and 
political life. Second is the Religious Democratic 
State (RDS) which underlines the significance of 
religious pluralist life in Indonesia and aims to 
make the state the guardian of all religions. Third 
is the Liberal Democratic State (LDS) or Secular 
Democratic State (SDS). The last model aspires 
to separate religions from the domination of the 
state (as is proposed in the second model) and 
advocates secularization as the basis of the state.
With regard to the Jakarta Charter in post-
Soeharto regime, the first and second models 
are a precise category to depict the reality sur-
rounding the sessions of MPR between 1999 
and 2002. More obviously, Sumarjan et al. 
(2002, p. 37) classify two distinctive thoughts. 
On the one hand, the Muslim-nationalist group 
concurs to apply the Charter because Indonesia 
is not merely the most populous Muslim coun-
try in the world, but Islamic sharia is also an 
alternative way to solve people’s problems due 
to the failure of secular laws. This thought was 
reinforced by Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(The United Development Party, PPP) and Partai 
Bulan Bintang (The Star Crescent Party, PBB). 
On the other hand, the nationalist-secular group 
refuses the Charter as the notion is no longer 
relevant with current circumstances. This group 
believes that the implementation of the Charter 
only create disharmony among people who have 
different belief and it will destroy Indonesian 
unity. The notion was supported by some major 
parties such as Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan (The Indonesian Democracy Party-
Struggle, PDI-P), Partai Golkar (The Party of the 
Functional Groups), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
(The National Awakening Party, PKB), and the 
Reform-Fraction. 
The debate amongst members of the parlia-
ment on the 1945 Constitution Article 29 eventu-
ally recommend four alternatives forms on the 
state principle as depicted in Table 1. 
The nationalist-Muslim group states that 
the realization of the Charter can resolve public 
problems such as corruption, prostitution and 
casino. As the result, Muslim communities can 
worship calmly. Meanwhile, the nationalist-
secular group believes that the Charter will 
discriminate small tribes and ethnics as well as 
affecting Indonesian disintegration (Sumarjan et 
al., 2002, p. 45). As a matter of fact, the result of 
the debate demonstrates that the Muslim group 
failed, as most members of parliament are not 
encouraging the Charter. However, although the 
Charter broke Muslim unity, according to some 
political analysts, the failure is not finale yet. The 
struggle should be continued, as winning or los-
ing is part of the struggle (Suara Muhammadiyah, 
2002, p. 6). 
Some Muslim communities believe that the 
seven words aim to earn better political life, but in 
fact its existence only affects Indonesian break-
down. It is a tricky choice, because there is no 
comprehensive dialogue among Muslim elites on 
the topic both on the notion of Islamic state and 
the strategy on how to fight for it. In addition, 
Muslim elites have no consensus for some major 
things. First is the notion of Islamic sharia and its 
institution in the national life. Second is political 
Table 1. Four Alternative Forms on the State Principle during the Sessions of MPR, August 2000
No. Alternative Suggestions Proponents 
1 The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God. PDIP and Golkar
2 The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God with the 
obligation upon Muslims to carry out Islamic laws. 
PPP and PBB
3 The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God with the 
obligation upon the followers of each religion to carry out its teachings.
PKB and Reform-Fraction
4 The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God, 
humanitarianism, Indonesian unity, democracy, and social justice.
None proponents 
Source: Laporan Panitia Ad Hoc, Buku II, Jilid Ketiga, Sekretariat Jendral MPR RI, 2000 and Sumarjan et al. (2002, p. 42). 
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strategy amongst Muslim elites. Third is the di-
lemma to decide whether to reinforce or reject the 
Charter. If the Charter is to be rejected, this group 
will be stamped as anti-sharia. On the contrary, 
if the Charter is to be approved, the group will 
be alleged as a fraction who takes advantage of 
the Charter as a political commodity. PPP was 
blamed for this case although it refuted. Other 
fractions testified that PPP doesn’t reinforce the 
Charter sincerely, just merely to attract Muslim 
supports (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2002, p. 6). 
The failure in implementing seven words of 
the Charter in the Article 29 is caused, at least, 
by four factors. Firstly, the notion does not obtain 
a support from major parties in the parliament. 
Secondly, two main Indonesian Muslim organiza-
tions both Muhammadiyah and NU assumed that 
the Charter is no longer compatible with current 
Indonesian circumstances. Thirdly, Muslim com-
munities unanimously are still able to execute 
their organizational programs without changing 
article 29. Fourthly, the notion is merely part of 
the effort of small groups to increase popular 
supports (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2002, p. 34). 
Theoretically, the emergence of reformation 
movement in 1998 and the desire to support the 
introduction of Islamic sharia during transition 
era is not an accident. It is a long history of po-
litical tensions among Indonesian elites as they 
have a political opportunity to do it. From various 
tensions, like an ice mountain, the peak of the 
turmoil affects the downfall of Soeharto as the 
president of Indonesia. As the result, a number 
of social movements, democratization waves, and 
reformation deeds emerge in the public sphere. 
Thus, to illustrate this situation–the desire to 
introduce the sharia, the paper attempts to apply 
a theory on political opportunity.
According to Tocqueville (Situmorang, 2007, 
p. 3–4), reformation movements will appear if the 
political and economic systems are changed from 
blocked to openness. McAdam (1982) and Tar-
row (1998) in particular explain how the political 
chance works within reformation movements. 
Firstly, social movements will emerge in the pu-
blic sphere if the access of various political insti-
tutions is opened. Secondly, interest groups will 
appear when political circumstances are unstable 
while new political system is not shaped yet. 
Thirdly, social movements will come out when 
among political elites suffered gigantic conflicts 
and in turn, the conflicts are utilized by other 
actors to reach the political chance. Fourthly, 
social movements will be formed if elites who 
created the alteration are invited by other elites 
in the government to set up the change. 
Tarrow (1998, p. 15) and Cragun et al. (Nd, p. 
233–234) highlight that sort of political tensions 
will increase rapidly when the actors got external 
supports to solve the problems or to reach the 
goals. Charles D. Brockett and Dieter Rucht add 
as quoted by Situmorang (2007, p. 5) that the 
increasing of political tensions is caused by the 
opened access to political parties and government 
institutions which political actors got backing 
from other actors who have similar interests.
In the case of Indonesia, political anxieties 
during New Order regime were started in 1970s 
when General Soemitro resisted the policy of 
General Ali Moertopo. Consequently, student 
movements organized demonstration that con-
demn the economic policy in which government 
tends to receive foreign investors, failed to build 
economic prosperity as well as the rise of bribery 
cases among Indonesian elites. The tensions ap-
peared for a second time in 1980s when LB. Mo-
erdani, Soeharto’s stalwart, criticized Soeharto’s 
interventions to military and his family involve-
ment in business. It affected the military fraction 
in the parliament which asked the government to 
give freedom in political and economic affairs. 
Soeharto eventually concurred with the demand. 
Nonetheless, the conflict between Soeharto and 
military re-emerged when Soeharto decided to 
choose Harmoko as the top leader of Golkar and 
B. J. Habibie as his running mate which both 
figures are not originated from military. Indeed, 
Soeharto’s verdict expressed his disillusionment 
to the military (Situmorang, 2007, p. 64–65).
The conflict continuously took place in 
the following case when Soeharto replaced his 
cabinet with closed colleagues, even his daugh-
ter. This situation was not good for Soeharto’s 
administration. The peak of the tension occurred 
when Harmoko, the spokesperson of the parlia-
ment at the time, suggested Soeharto to resign 
from his position. This unstable tension was 
supported by the resignation of some ministries 
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from the cabinet as well as the reinforcement 
of domestic and international parties. Besides, 
additional proponents came from a number of 
opposition elites such as Amien Rais (chairman 
of Muhammadiyah), Gus Dur (chairman of NU), 
Megawati (the nationalist activist), Nurcholish 
Madjid (public elder), Arifin Panigoro (business-
man) as well as several NGO’s activists e.g. 
Adnan Buyung Nasution and Munir. They played 
a fundamental role to demand the reformation 
movement (Situmorang, 2007, p. 65–66).
ELITES IN MUHAMMADIYAH:  
CONCEPT AND ITS  
CLASSIFICATION
The term of “elite” etymologically means the 
richest, most powerful, best educated or best 
trained group in a society (Cambridge Dictionary, 
2008; Oxford Dictionary, 2008, p. 145). Accord-
ing to Higley (2010, p. 1), this term academically 
was introduced by Pareto, Mosca and Michels in 
Europe. Scholars define elites as superior groups 
in society (Gauba, 2003, p. 440), the most talented 
and admirable individuals (Pareto, 1915/1935), 
organized and ruling classes who usually have a 
certain material, intellectual, and moral superio-
rity over those they govern (Mosca, 1923/1939, 
p. 51), leaders who have an ability to control 
of funds, information flows, promotions, and 
other aspects of organizational power (Michels, 
1915/1962; see Linz, 2006), a controlling group 
less than a majority in size (Dahl, 1958, p. 464), 
persons who are able to affect political outcomes 
(Higley, 2010), and individuals who are at the top 
of the pyramid or pyramids of political, economic 
and social power (Putnam, 1976, p. 14). Thus, 
Higley (2010) posits that elites encompass not 
merely of prestigious leaders such as top politi-
cians, important businessmen, high-level civil 
servants and senior military officers, but also 
less individually known leaders of mass organiza-
tions such as trade unions, important voluntary 
associations and politically consequential mass 
movements. Moreover, Whitmeyer (2002, p. 
322) argues that elites are people with attributes 
that lead other to be ranked higher and accorded 
more prestige and respect than ordinary people. 
Meanwhile, Delican (2000, p. 334) explicitly 
assumes that the key concept of elites is “power” 
and whoever has the power, they are the leader of 
society. Heredity, wealth, intellect, organizations 
are the bridge to reach power. Thus, it can be 
understood that elites are petite quantities who 
have power to govern common people and to 
control organizational resources. They are bril-
liant and respected individuals who have strong 
influences to direct social changes.
In the context of Islam, the concept of elites 
can refer to Geertz’s (1976, p. 5–6) thesis on the 
classification Javanese society into three groups, 
i.e. abangan, santri, priyayi. More specifically, 
Mulkhan (1989, p. 17) states that elites in Islam 
can be symbolized by kyai (Muslim elders), 
ulama (religious scholars, jurists), mubaligh 
(Islamic missionary, propagandist), and ustadz 
(religious/Islamic teachers). Nonetheless, there 
is vagueness on the concept between ulama 
and intellectual. According to Latif (2005, p. 
583–585), it can be traced back since 1980s when 
most Muslim scholars particularly graduates of 
IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies) studied 
to western colleges and pupils in secular schools 
earned Islamic teachings and vice versa. On the 
one hand, a number of intellectuals behave like 
mubaligh or ustadz by referring to Al-Qur’an 
verses. On the other hand, most ulama have an 
ability to illustrate their personality as an intellec-
tual who can talk about secular topics. Afterward, 
the phenomena of Islamic colleges which have 
secular faculties (social and natural sciences) and 
ulama earn academic honorary insert the ambigu-
ity this concept. Thus, it needs a new name for 
this category, i.e. Muslim intellectual. The term 
is frequently employed in the academic environ-
ment since 1980s, particularly to demonstrate 
explosive changes from intellectuals to ulama 
and ulama to Muslim intellectuals.
In Islam, elites can be classified into two 
groups: Ulama and Muslim intellectuals. There 
are threefold feature for ulama. Firstly, they have 
comprehensive knowledge, good quality in belief 
and attitudes and useful charities. Secondly, they 
have entire knowledge on Islamic studies such as 
aqidah (faith), moral and Islamic laws. Thirdly, 
they have wide-range knowledge on practical and 
experimental sciences (BRM, 1995, p. 14–15). 
Meanwhile, Muslim intellectuals also have 
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threefold feature. Firstly, they typically focus 
to analyze social problems and how to solve 
them. Secondly, they promote critical thoughts 
by creating models of community development. 
Thirdly, they wrote precious works and perpetu-
ally disseminate previous Muslim scholars’ works 
(Rahardjo, 1996, p. 24–26, 66). 
By applying Putnam’s (1976) thesis on the 
classification of elites into three group namely 
positional (who hold official positions in orga-
nizations), decisional (who have capability to 
make policies), and reputational (those who have 
credentials as leaders), elites in Muhammadiyah 
can be defined as who became functionaries in the 
central board of Muhammadiyah between 1999 
and 2005. The elites have influential power to 
direct public opinions and organizational decrees 
as well as maintain proponents’ doctrines. There-
fore, elites in Muhammadiyah frequently have, at 
least, thoughts concerning the debate on Islamic 
sharia including the Jakarta Charter.
More specifically, elites in Muhammadiyah 
were restricted between 1999 and 2005. The year 
of 1999 is a periode of replacement of Amien 
Rais by Syafi’i Ma’arif when Amien led PAN 
since 1998. Meanwhile, 2005 is a final period of 
Muhammadiyah under Syafi’i Ma’arif since he 
was elected for a second time as the chairman of 
the Central Board of Muhammadiyah in the 44th 
Congress in Jakarta, 2000. Selecting the period 
cannot be separated from the debate on the Ja-
karta Charter during the annual sessions of MPR 
1999–2002. Table 2 revealed the functionaries 
of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah in the 
period of 1999–2000 (post-Tanwir5 in Bandung). 
In the following year, Muhammadiyah held 
the 44th congress in Jakarta, 8–11 July 2000. 
The congress eventually decided Ahmad Syafi’i 
Ma’arif as the chairman of the Central Board 
of Muhammadiyah in 2000–2005. For more 
detail, the elites who assist Ma’arif leadership 
are presented in Table 3.
During Ma’arif leadership, Muhammadiyah 
succeeded to keep neutral relationship with the 
government and any political parties. Besides, a 
number of young elites at the time were elected 
such as Din Syamsuddin, Haedar Nashir, and 
Hajriyanto Y. Tohari. It demonstrates that Mu-
hammadiyah appreciates and recruits young 
generation.
5 Tanwir is the highest meeting in Muhammadiyah after 
Muktamar (congress) which should be held, at least, 
three times for one period (AD/ART Muhammadiyah, 
2011, p. 18). 
Table 2. Functionaries of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah in 1999–2000 
No. Name of Elites Position 
1 Prof. Dr. H. Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif Chairman 
2 Drs. H. Sutrisno Muhdam Vice chairman
3 Drs. H. A. Rosyad Sholeh Vice chairman
4 H. M. Muchlas Abror Secretary 
5 Dr. H. A. Watik Pratiknya Secretary
6 Drs. H. M. Syukriyanto AR Treasurer 
7 H. Rahimi Sutan Treasurer 
8 Prof. Drs. H. Asjmuni Abdurrahman Advisor for religious affairs 
9 Prof. Drs. H. Abdul Malik Fadjar, M.Sc. Advisor for human resource and culture development 
10 H. Ramli Thaha, S.H. Advisor for organisational affairs 
11 Dr. H. Yahya A. Muhaimin Advisor for educational affairs 
12 Prof. Dr. H. M. Amien Rais, M.A. Advisor for political affairs
13 H. Rusydi Hamka Advisor for external affairs
Source: Laporan PP Muhammadiyah in the 44th Congress, Jakarta, 8–11 July 2000, p. 30–31.
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Table 3. Functionaries of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah in 2000–2005
No. Name of Elites Position 
1 Prof. Dr. H. Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif Chairman
2 Prof. Drs. H. Abdul Malik Fadjar, M.Sc. Vice chairman
3 Drs. H. A. Rosyad Sholeh Vice chairman
4 Prof. Dr. H. M. Din Syamsuddin Vice chairman
5 Prof. Dr. H. M. Amin Abdullah Vice chairman
6 Drs. H. Haedar Nashir, M.Si Secretary
7 Drs. H. M. Goodwill Zubir Secretary
8 Dr. H. Abdul Munir Mulkhan Vice secretary
9 Drs. H. Hajriyanto Y. Thohari, M.A. Vice secretary 
10 Ir. H. M. Dasron Hamid, M.Sc Treasurer 
11 Dr. H. Bambang Sudibyo Treasurer 
12 Dr. H. Yahya A. Muhaimin Advisor for research and educational affairs 
13 Prof. Dr. H. Ismail Sunny, S.H., M.C.L. Advisor for political, human rights, and international affairs 
14 Prof. Dr. H. M. Dawam Rahardjo Advisor for economy and community empowerment 
15 Dr. dr. H. A. Watik Pratiknya Advisor for healthy and people welfare
16 H. M. Muchlas Abror Advisor for organisational management 
17 Prof. Drs. H. Asjmuni Abdurrahman Advisor for religious affairs 
18 Drs. H. M. Syukriyanto, AR., M.Hum Advisor for human resources and autonomous councils 
19 Drs. H. Muhammad Muqoddas, Lc., 
M.Ag.
Advisor for Islamic propagation
Source: Laporan PP Muhammadiyah in the 45th Congress, Malang, 2005, p. 6–7; BRM, September 2005, p. 4–5; Suara Muhammadiyah, 16-
31/03/2002, p.  2.
From both periods, the paper found nineteen 
names which can be categorized as the elite. They 
were Syafi’i Ma’arif, Amien Rais, Din Syamsud-
din, Haedar Nashir, Rosyad Sholeh, Dawam 
Rahardjo, Munir Mulkhan, Amin Abdullah, 
Asjmuni Abdurrahman, Muhammad Muqoddas, 
Goodwill Zubir, Malik Fadjar, Yahya Muhaimin, 
Rosyad Sholeh, Ismail Sunny, Watik Pratiknya, 
Syukriyanto AR, Muchlas Abror and Hajriyanto 
Y. Tohari. These names gave significant thoughts 
concerning the Jakarta Charter. The rest is not 
selected as they have no statements and no 
academic works regarding the topic.
POLITICAL THOUGHTS OF THE 
ELITES IN MUHAMMADIYAH
Political thoughts can be grasped as the perception 
and attitude which based on the belief, knowledge 
and previous experiences. To classify the elites’ 
thoughts, the paper applies two opposite models. 
First is inclusive thought. It prefers to adopt 
substantial values rather than symbolic ways. It 
can be found in some models of thoughts namely 
transformative, critical, realistic, accommodative 
and pragmatic. Second is exclusive thought. It 
intends to use formalistic and symbolic texts 
rather than universal values. It can be found in 
the type of formalistic, idealistic, and totalistic 
thoughts. 
According to Indonesian Muslim scholars, 
the totalistic, idealistic and formalistic thoughts 
stress that Al-Quran and As-Sunnah are the only 
guidance for Muslim daily activities (Anwar, 
1995, p. 144–183; Fakih, 2001, p. 35; Nashir, 
2000, p. 150–151; Jurdi, 2010, p. 40). Solution 
to overcome the problems in the social, economic 
and political fields should be based on the two 
Islamic fundamental sources. Meanwhile, the 
attitude of moderate and substantive underline 
their outlooks on the substance of Islamic teach-
ings. Islam has the whole doctrines and principles 
and it should be transformed to resolve particular 
problems in different cases. Furthermore, the 
transformative stresses its thoughts on human 
values. Islamic teachings should be transformed 
50 | Masyarakat Indonesia, Vol. 41 (1), Juni 2015  
into reality in order to liberate human from ig-
norance, injustice, and backwardness. Besides, 
it should be written into scholar works to affect 
social changes. 
Afterward, the critical highlights its thoughts 
on problem solving by paying attention into the 
government system. Structural approaches will 
help to identify injustice and misunderstanding 
in seeing a reality such as terrorism acts. Ad-
ditionally, the realistic thought emphasizes the 
relationship between substantive meaning and 
realities. Islam must be understood into different 
meaning because of various cultures. Moreover, 
the accommodative thought points up cooperation 
with other parties although it still gives critiques 
towards injustice deeds. This thought is flexible 
in coping with political dynamics. Last but not 
least, the pragmatic thought views that Muslim 
people should apply practical ways in the political 
stage and leave idealistic outlooks. This thought 
avoids personal and communal conflicts.
Muhammadiyah already issued an of-
ficial letter with the number 10/EDR/I.0/I/2002 
concerning the explanation of the attitude of 
Muhammadiyah towards the implementation 
of Islamic sharia and the change of the 1945 
Constitution Article 29. The letter was signed by 
the chairman and secretary of the Central Board 
of Muhammadiyah, Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif and 
Haedar Nashir in Yogyakarta, August 16th, 2002. 
Moreover, the letter was circulated among Mu-
hammadiyah members and supporters across the 
country through an authorized magazine Suara 
Muhammadiyah and an organizational report 
book Berita Resmi Muhammadiyah (BRM). In 
various meetings and religious teachings, regional 
leaders of Muhammadiyah also disseminated the 
letter, even discussed it.
With respect to the content of the letter, this 
is some relevant sentences: 
“… As one of the largest Muslim organizations in 
Indonesia which had participated to solve national 
problems, Muhammadiyah cannot avoid from a 
current controversial issue. Thus, Muhammadiyah 
officially rejects the notion of the change of the 
1945 Constitution Article 29. It does not mean 
that Muhammadiyah refuses Islamic sharia in 
Indonesia as common people misunderstood as 
well as Muhammadiyah members and supporters. 
Muhammadiyah as an Islamic propagation move-
ment certainly reinforces the concept of whole 
Islamic sharia, because implementing Islamic 
teachings is part of Muslim faith.
… Muhammadiyah usually considers the circum-
stances and other significant aspects to decide 
a strategy. Believing to Islamic sharia and its 
implementation is compulsory for Muslims, but 
the strategy can adjust with contemporary circum-
stances. As a result, Muhammadiyah believes that 
using the seven words explicitly into the Constitu-
tion is not a precise approach. This assumption 
is based on two things. First is the reality that 
Muslim power in the parliament is petite. Second 
is the terrible impact of disharmony amongst reli-
gious people. For now, through Muslim elites in 
the parliament, Muhammadiyah expects that the 
rules are not contradicting with sharia and asks 
to revise the rules which opposed with Islamic 
values. Most importantly, the realization of sharia 
should be reflected in Muslim daily activities in 
order to give peaceful values…”
However, as a matter of fact, elites in Mu-
hammadiyah have distinctive thoughts towards 
the official decree. It demonstrates that the 
pattern of the leadership in Muhammadiyah has 
various models. The paper analyses that from 
both literature and interview references, elites in 
Muhammadiyah have, at least, three distinctive 
political thoughts concerning the Jakarta Charter 
in-post Soeharto regime.
1. The Moderate-transformative   
 Group 
This group has a number of features. Firstly, 
they believe that Islam is a humanist religion 
which has universal tenets. Secondly, they are 
emphasizing more in solving social problems, 
teaching civil rights, and divesting people from 
backwardness and social injustice rather than 
struggling with Islamic-formalistic symbols. 
Thirdly, Islamic values should be implemented 
in community empowerment activities by creat-
ing social institutions such as NGO. Fourthly, 
the values have to be reflected into advantageous 
works which have people welfare-oriented goals 
(Al-Hamdi, 2013, p. 281). 
Sociologically, they are academicians and 
social activists in NGOs. Their thoughts occa-
sionally became a heated issue in public spaces. 
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Most of them studied in western colleges and, 
at least, understood western perspectives and 
methodologies. This paper identifies some elites 
in Muhammadiyah such as Syafi’i Ma’arif, 
Dawam Rahardjo, Munir Mulkhan, Amin Abdul-
lah, and Haedar Nashir. In addition, this group 
has a wide relationship with various communities 
embracing the Muslim liberal group or “Islamic 
Left”. Therefore, the stamp “liberal thinker” is 
frequently closed to them.
Prior to the breakdown of New Order re-
gime, Ma’arif (1984, p. 76) evidently rejected 
the implementation of the Jakarta Charter as the 
state principle. He believes that the engagement 
of Muslim elites in two historical moments, the 
sessions of PPKI and Majelis Konstituante, which 
discussed the Constitution is tangible that Islamic 
sharia is no longer applicable in Indonesia. Thus, 
when certain Muslim communities wish to imple-
ment the Charter, Ma’arif assumes that the notion 
will be supported merely around ten percent of 
parliamentarians (Kompas, 7/02/2002). His 
prediction is not wrong. The finale decision of 
the annual session of MPR stated that Pancasila 
is still the Indonesian principle. 
Nonetheless, Ma’arif (1996, p. 31) has an 
understanding to the first principle of Pancasila. 
He is not hesitant that the Godliness principle 
is an alteration for seven or eight lose words. 
It depicts monotheism teachings as an Islamic 
belief. Afterward, the principle also allowed non-
Muslims to adhere their faith. According to the 
Qur’an, Muslims are prohibited to force other to 
follow their credence.6 This view, as a matter of 
fact, ultimately became an authoritative attitude 
of Muhammadiyah.
According to Rahardjo (2002, p. 241–242), 
Pancasila is a synthesis between tradition, reli-
gion, and modernity in contemporary Islamic tra-
dition. Pancasila is an excellent contemplation of 
Indonesian intellectuals in searching an identity. 
Thus, Pancasila is not only an identity for Mus-
lims but also for Christians, Catholics, Buddhist, 
Hindu as well as Confucians. Moreover, Rahardjo 
believes that the emergence of Pancasila will 
eliminate extremist-radical Muslim movements. 
On the contrary, if Islam–social Islam, cultural 
6  See, Al-Qur’an Surah Al-Baqarah verses 256. 
Islam, and political Islam is feeble, Pancasila 
will suffer similar fate. 
“… The history for a long time has created Islam 
as main aspect for nationality. Pancasila without 
Islam is like a skeleton without meat and soul,” 
Rahardjo wrote in his book (2002).
Meanwhile, Mulkhan evaluates that Muslims 
sadly are not considering real circumstances. 
They are more normative and romantic. As shown 
by the history that the Jakarta Charter repeatedly 
copes with the failure. Therefore, Mulkhan thinks 
that the implementation of the seven words is 
no longer compatible with recent Indonesian 
cultures. 
“Who want to support the Charter? Previous 
evidences demonstrated the failure. Nowadays, 
Muslim politicians not merely enrolled with 
Islamist parties like PKS and PPP, but also signed 
up with Golkar, Democrat, PDI-P, and other 
secular parties,” Mulkhan said in his residence 
in Kotagede, Yogyakarta, 20 October, 2010. 
Thus, he provides an alternative notion 
on the pattern of the state with the concept of 
“substantial-Islamic state”. The notion has similar 
values with Muhammadiyah’s goal: Masyarakat 
Islam yang Sebenar-benarnya (the real Islamic 
society, known as MIYS). If this is the concept of 
Islamic state, the citizens are not obligated to join 
up with Islam, but they only conduct daily activi-
ties which are appropriate with Islamic values. 
“It is my concept on Islamic state, not Kartosu-
wiryo’s version,” he added obviously.
Likewise, Nashir (2007, p. 220–281) as-
sumes that Muslim communities have to consider 
historical proofs. If the Muslim community is 
only trapped to implement Islamic sharia, they 
have no capability to deal with the future. Thus, 
Abdullah (2002, p. xiii-xiv) believes that the uni-
versal values in Islam should be contextualized 
and transformed into local cultures. We will meet 
with various local customs which they have dif-
ferent values on goodness and badness. In other 
word, Abdullah explains that local customs have 
philosophical messages in a number of social 
aspects–spiritual, morals as well as critiques.
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2. The Moderate-realistic Group
This group has some features. Firstly, they are 
confident that there is a correlation between the 
substances of Islamic tenets with the reality, and 
in turn the universal values in Islam have to be 
presented among different society. Secondly, they 
prefer to struggle by applying a slogan “politics 
of salt” rather than “politics of lipstick”. It is more 
suitable with Islamic values. Thirdly, it is possible 
to contextualize Islam with local customs in order 
to attract other communities to understand Is-
lamic teachings with distinctive ways. This paper 
ultimately detects some elites in Muhammadiyah: 
Amien Rais, Malik Fadjar, Yahya A. Muhaimin, 
Ismail Sunny, Watik Pratiknya, Rosyad Sholeh, 
Muchlas Abror, Syukriyanto AR, Hajriyanto Y. 
Tohari, Muhammad Muqoddas, Asjmuni Abdur-
rahman, and Goodwill Zubir (Al-Hamdi, 2013, 
p. 282). 
Sociologically, they are lecturers as well as 
civil servants in the state institutes. Most of them 
graduated from western colleges. This group 
has close linkages with various segments in the 
society and helps them to solve their problems. 
Even some of them held governmental positions 
both in legislative and executive such as Amien 
Rais, Malik Fadjar, and Yahya Muhaimin.
Rais argues that Pancasila as the state ideol-
ogy is adequate to represent Indonesian Muslim 
interests. On the contrary, the notion of Islamic 
state will trigger religious conflicts amongst 
society. Therefore, the Indonesian constitution 
has the aroma of “Theo-democracy”.
“The Article 29 can be changed eternally,” Rais 
said obviously.
Furthermore, Rais (2008, p. 12–13) expects 
that Islam should apply the philosophy of “politics 
of salt” rather than “politics of lipstick or flag”. 
He states that the lipstick or flag, indeed, will 
appear in the public, but unfortunately its advan-
tages cannot be tasted immediately by people.
“So, why we are still fascinated to display the 
flag or wear the lipstick thickly?” Rais asked as 
quoted in www.majalah.tempointeraktif.com, 5 
November, 2001.
Rais is optimistic that Pancasila is the best 
way that Indonesia does not get caught up in 
secularism or theocracy.
“For the future of sharia, when Muslims in 
Indonesia have an obvious objective and most 
members of parliament concur to establish the 
Islamic state, that’s a precise time to decide it,” 
Rais added (2008, p. 13).
Muhaimin has a similar thought that theo-de-
mocracy is the greatest way for the state principle. 
If Indonesia utilizes secular system like America 
and Turkey, it will curb human rights to wor-
ship, conversely, if Indonesia applies theocracy 
system, it will discriminate the plurality among 
Indonesian society. Although Muhaimin agrees 
with Pancasila, he still criticizes that Pancasila, 
however, has no obvious goal. As a matter of 
fact, Pancasila cannot guarantee people’s rights 
in the case of Prita Mulyasari, Minah, and other 
marginal citizens. 
“They are some victims of the ambiguity of 
Pancasila. Thus, the government must rule this 
affair. The grains of Pancasila is not merely to 
be memorised,” Muhaimin said at the office of 
Department of International Relation, Gadjah 
Mada University, 29 October, 2010. 
Furthermore, Fadjar utters that we have to 
learn from Indonesian long history. In fact, the 
Jakarta Charter is no longer relevant with current 
circumstances although the values of the 1945 
Constitution is suitable with Islamic teachings. 
“If the Charter eventually is applied, it will be 
exploited by certain interest groups. The group 
will say that this is halal (allowed in Islam) and 
that is haram (prohibited),” he confirmed in his 
house in Yogyakarta, 23 October 2010. 
Tohari assumes that the driving factor of 
interest conflict among Muslim elites is that they 
have no consensus about Islamic state. They have 
dissimilar perspectives with regard to the amend-
ment Article 29 during the MPR’s sessions.
“Each Muslim elite still has huge ego,” Tohari 
said as cited by Suara Muhammadiyah, 16-
30/09/2002, p. 7. 
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Moreover, Syukiyanto also has a similar 
thought. He suggests that we are not only too 
formalistic but also implement the substance of 
Islamic tenets. 
“If the Jakarta Charter is utilized as the state 
principle, but the people are not practicing it, 
could we enforce it?” Syukiyanto asked.
Syuki obviously rejects sort of religious 
propagation by employing violence and brutal-
ity movements. He argues that we have to build 
gigantic power to resist corruption and awful 
bureaucracy. To build the power, Muslim com-
munities can create it through economy (such as 
Islamic-based banks), education (such as Islamic 
schools and colleges) as well as other potential 
channels.
“If it is clear, we can use the Charter as the basis 
of the state,” he added. 
More specifically, Syuki provides a real 
instance that he has a Muslim friend in Bali. 
The friend develops a ranch and irrigation sur-
rounding his dwelling. The ranch and irrigation 
give various advantages for society as well as 
non-Muslim inhabitants. As the result, the society 
respects him and offers to build a mosque beside 
his home.
“It is a story that the Islamic propagation not em-
ploys violence ways, but by applying peaceful,” 
he told in the headquarters of the central board of 
Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, 19 October 2010. 
The last refusal to the Jakarta Charter re-
vealed in the article of Sunny (1995, p. iii-vii). 
He believes that the first principle of Pancasila 
is part of God’s teachings. Thus, the Charter is 
not required to be embraced in the Constitution.
“That’s good if the seven words in the Article 29 
are merely maintained in the regulation, as the 
Constitution commonly rules the state and the na-
tion. Regarding the seven words is too technical,” 
Sunny, who became an ambassador of Indonesia 
for Saudi Arabia, explored in a press conference at 
the headquarters of the Central Board of Muham-
madiyah as cited in Kompas, 7 February 2002. 
3. The Moderate-accommodative  
  Group
This group has some features. Firstly, they have 
cooperative and accommodative attitudes towards 
various interest groups. Secondly, they assume 
that an ideology is not too fundamental for po-
litical matters. They prefer seeking a legitimate 
foundation to strengthen a bargaining position 
with other competitors. Thirdly, they have incon-
sistent attitudes in reacting to Muslim politics. We 
will find these attitudes to the personality of Din 
Syamsuddin (Al-Hamdi, 2013, p. 283).
On one occasion, when Muhammadiyah 
officially rejected the notion of Islamic state, 
Syamsuddin powerfully reinforces this decision. 
Prior to his position as one of the chairmen in 
Muhammadiyah, Syamsuddin wrote in Journal 
of Ulumul Qur’an No. 2 Vol. IV (1993, p. 4–9) 
that he obviously rejected the implementation 
Islamic sharia in Indonesia. Furthermore, in his 
following article, Syamsuddin (2000, p. 43–44) 
believes that the notion of Pancasila essentially is 
Islamic state. It can be seen that, in fact, Pancasila 
reached a noble position among society and has 
similar meaning with universal Islamic tenets 
such as tauhid (unity of God), humanism, fra-
ternity, democracy, and justice. Thus, Pancasila 
is frequently called as a model of principle for a 
religious democracy.
“Pancasila will receive a respected position. It 
is not only based on a constitutional guarantee 
but also an acknowledgment in Garis-garis Besar 
Haluan Negara (The Outlines of State Policy, 
GBHN) that Pancasila is a foundation for the 
national development while religion is a spiri-
tual and moral foundation for the development,” 
Syamsuddin stated. 
On the other occasions, Syamsuddin who ap-
peared as a Muslim figure gives an approval state-
ment to the implementation of the Jakarta Charter 
as the basis of the state. At the time, Syamsuddin 
assumes that we should consider the notion of the 
implementation Islamic sharia, because, indeed, 
Islamic teachings repeatedly are eliminated from 
the national life (www.majalah.tempointeraktif.
com, 5 November 2001). Furthermore, Syam-
suddin suggests that it is a sparkling notion if 
we can adopt Islamic sharia in decentralization 
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era. The sharia will change previous constitution 
and provide solution for a better circumstance 
(Republika, 19 October 2001). 
“As a matter of fact, the implementation of Islamic 
sharia needs a long time. First of all, we must 
give a positive impression to the public that the 
discourse on sharia is not scary. Thus, we do not 
hurry,” Syamsuddin explained in a public lecture 
on Islamic studies in Universitas Muhammadiyah 
Yogyakarta, 13 October 2001. 
However, Syamsuddin states that if we 
count the vote in the parliament, the support 
to the Jakarta Charter will fail. It means that 
most Islam-based parties do not concur with the 
Charter. The proponent of the Charter is merely 
PPP, PK, and PBB.
“I’m saying yes to the Islamic sharia, but the 
struggle to realize it is a different matter” he 
added as cited by Republika, 19 October 2001. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To sum up, the given data said that although 
Muhammadiyah officially declared to reject the 
introduction of Islamic sharia, in fact, we found 
different political thoughts among its elites. There 
are three kinds of model of political thoughts 
in response towards the Jakarta Charter during 
reformation era:
1) The moderate-transformative. This group 
rejects to establish an Islamic state due to 
the plurality of Indonesia with a number of 
cultures and ethnics. They prefer to adopt 
substantive values of Islam and stress that 
Islamic tenets should be transformed to solve 
social problems such as alleviating poverty, 
eradicating corruption, and restoring educa-
tion system.
2) The moderate-realistic. This group prefers 
to utilize the philosophy “politics of salt” 
rather than “politics of lipstick” as well as 
refuses symbolic and violence ways. Thus, 
it is impossible to implement the notion of 
Islamic state in Indonesia because of its 
complex society.
3) The moderate-accomodative. This group 
frequently demonstrates accommodative 
and cooperative attitudes to others. Thus, 
they never give an extreme position to any 
cases. If they conduct it, it will damage their 
image. They usually tend to exploit political 
opportunities to appeal Muslims sympathy. 
It is noticeable that among three models of 
thought, there are no elites who concur to estab-
lish the Islamic state although current dynamics 
demonstrated that a few of local elites in Muham-
madiyah do not refuse the notion. Nonetheless, 
Islamic sharia permanently will be a part of 
Indonesian political dynamics due to the majority 
of the Muslims within. Current issues regarding 
extremist-Islamic movements around the world 
such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and 
Boko Haram in Nigeria are the real evidence that 
Indonesia is the main target for these hazardous 
organizations to establish the Islamic state.
Therefore, Muslim elites have to contribute 
their most excellent thoughts to invent Islam as 
a universal religion whose claims of being salih 
li kulli zaman wa makan (suitable for all times 
and conditions) and to create Indonesia to become 
baldatun thayyibatun wa rabbun ghafur (a wel-
fare and secure state). We should also encourage 
and promote bravely these notions. If not, the 
notion on the establishment of the Islamic state 
threatens the development of democracy and 
sovereignty in Indonesia.
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